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Abstract
We examine the relationship between the organization of a multi-divisional rm and its ability
to adapt production decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-
level managers have superior information about local conditions, and incentive conicts are
negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to local information than a
decentralized one. As a result, and in contrast to what is commonly argued, an increase in
product market competition that makes adaptation more important can favor centralization
rather than decentralization.
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1 Introduction
The organization theorist Chester Barnard and the economist Friedrich Hayek shared the view that
the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular
circumstances of time and place (Hayek, 1945, p.524). But whereas Hayek viewed adaptation
as an autonomous process, undertaken by individual economic actors, Barnard (1938) stressed
the ability of organizations to engage in what Oliver Williamson (1996, 2002) calls coordinated
adaptation.Williamson, referring to Barnard and challenging Hayek, argues that:
Some kind of disturbances require coordinated responses, lest the individual parts operate at
cross-purposes or otherwise suboptimize. Failures of coordination may arise because autonomous
parties read and react to signals di¤erently, even though their purpose is to achieve a timely and
compatible combined response. [...] The authority relationship (at) has adaptive advantages over
autonomy for transactions of a bilaterally (or multi-laterally) dependent kind(1996, p.103).
In this paper we explore the relationship between a rms organizational structure and its ability
to adapt to a changing environment. We ask when adaptation is best achieved in a decentralized
organizationthrough a process of autonomous adaptation as envisioned by Hayekand when it is
best done in a centralized organizationthrough a process of administrative control and coordinated
adaptation, as envisioned by Barnard and Williamson. We then examine how the degree of product
market competition a¤ects how the rm optimally adapts to changes in its environment. A
commonly made argument is that competition makes it more important for rms to be responsive to
changes in their environment and, therefore, favors decentralization. This argument is summarized,
for instance, in Tim Harfords recent best-seller Adapt:
Thanks to globalisation, businesses have ventured into new and varied markets, where they face
intense competition. The traditional purpose of centralisation is to make sure every business unit
is coordinated and nobody is duplicating anyone elses e¤ort [...]. But a centralised organisation
doesnt work so well when confronted with a diverse, fast-moving range of markets. The advantage
of decentralisation, rapid adaptation to local circumstances, has grown(pp.75-76).
While intuitively appealing, we argue that the above reasoning is awed when thinking about
the large-scale, multi-divisional organizations that have come to dominate many industries.
To study the issues of adaptation, competition, and organization, we consider a multi-divisional
rm whose prots depend only on how the production level of each division is adapted to its local
demand conditions. The production decisions can be either strategic complementsif there are
1
increasing returns to aggregate productionor strategic substitutesif there are decreasing returns.
We show two main results. First, even when division managers have superior information about
their local demand conditions, and incentive conicts are negligible, the headquarter manager may
be better at adapting production to demand conditions than the division managers. Second, we
show that an increase in competition does not only make it more important that rms adapt to
changes in their environments. Instead, it also changes how rms should adapt to such changes,
making coordinated adaptation more important relative to autonomous adaptation. As a result,
an increase in competition can actually favor centralization rather than decentralization.
Organizing to Adapt. The result that a centralized organization can be better at adapting
to changes in the environment than a decentralized one follows from three observations. The rst
is that if decisions are interdependent, adaptation involves both autonomous adaptationadapting
each production decision to its local demand conditionsand coordinated adaptationadapting each
decision to the other production decisions, and through this channel to the demand conditions in
the other markets. Coordination is therefore an input into adaptation that allows the decision
makers to adapt to demand shocks more aggressively. Moreover, the more interdependent the pro-
duction decisions are, the more important coordinated adaptation becomes relative to autonomous
adaptation.
The second observation is that while an organizations ability to engage in autonomous adapta-
tion depends on how much decision makers know about the demand conditions in their respective
markets, their ability to engage in coordinated adaptation depends on how much they know about
each othersmarkets. And organizations ability to adapt therefore depends on both the depth
and the breadth of the decision makers information. Moreover, the more interdependent the
production decisions, the more important breadth becomes relative to depth.
The nal observation is that even though each division manager knows more about his market,
and therefore has an advantage in terms of depth, the headquarter manager may well know more
about the other markets, and thus have an advantage in terms of breadth. This will be the case,
for instance, if there are economies to knowledge specialization (Becker and Murphy 1992, Bolton
and Dewatripont 1994, and Sims 2002) or if cognitive constraints make it more di¢ cult for division
managers to talk to each other than to headquarters (Ferreira and Sah 2012). And even when
there are no economies to knowledge specialization or cognitive constraints, such an information
structure can arise naturally when managers communicate with each other strategically, as we will
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show below.
Together these three observations imply our rst main result: for su¢ ciently interdependent
decisions, a headquarter manager who knows a little bit about all markets is better at adapting
production to demand conditions than the division managers who know a lot about their own
markets but very little about each others.
Organizing to Compete. To explore the informal argument that competition favors decen-
tralization, we examine an increase in competition that makes demand more price sensitive. In line
with the standard intuition, an increase in the price sensitivity of demand makes it more important
to adapt production to demand conditions. What the standard intuition overlooks, however, is
that an increase in the price sensitivity of demand also changes the process through which deci-
sions are adapted to demand shocks. In particular, the more price sensitive demand is, the more
interdependent are the production decisions, and thus the more important coordinated adaptation
and breadth become relative to autonomous adaptation and depth. In our setting, an increase in
competition therefore favors centralization over decentralization.
While this argument may be counter-intuitive at rst, it is consistent with the recent experience
of multi-divisional rms such as Unilever that have responded to increased competition by central-
izing decision rights. In particular, until 1999, Unilever had a very decentralized organizational
structure in which division managers had vast decision making authority. Since then, however,
Unilever has gone through a series of reorganizations that have centralized authority and limited
the power of division managers. Recently, Unilever Chief Executive Patrick Cescau explained these
reorganizations:
Historically, Unilevers business had been built up around highly autonomous operating compa-
nies, with their own portfolio priorities and all the resources they needed marketing, development,
supply chain to develop their business in whatever way they saw t. This was a highly e¤ective
way of building a truly multinational business almost 50 years before the term was invented. But it
had become less suited to an increasingly globalised, competitive landscape, where battles were being
fought and won with global scale and know-how, and top-down, strategically driven allocation of
resources. In todays world, a hundred di¤erent portfolio strategies run the risk of adding up to
no strategy at all. Its not e¢ cient, it doesnt leverage your best assets and it doesnt build strong
global positions.1
1This quote is taken from a presentation that Patrick Cescau gave at the Unilever Investor Seminar on 13 March
2007. The transcript is available at www.unilever.com.
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In line with at least the spirit of our model, competition therefore favored centralization and
it favored centralization because it made it more important to adapt to changes by coordinating
strategies, realizing scale economies, and quickly moving resources across divisions.
Strategic Communication. Below we rst establish our results in a model without incentive
conicts and in which we take the generalist-specialist information structure as given, that is, we
exogenously assume that a headquarter manager knows a little bit about all markets, whereas di-
vision managers know a lot about their own markets but very little about each others. In Section
6, we then endogenize the information structure by allowing for incentive conicts and strategic
communication. Drawing upon Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008), we assume division man-
agers privately observe demand conditions in their own market but must rely on (horizontal) cheap
talk communication to learn about the demand condition of the other division. Communication is
strategic because each division manager puts more weight on the prots of his own division than on
those of the other division. The headquarter manager, in contrast, is unbiased but has no private
information. She must rely on (vertical) cheap talk communication to learn about demand in both
markets. We characterize the quality of both horizontal and vertical communication and show that
division managers typically share more information with an unbiased headquarter manager than
with each other. The generalist-specialist information structure that is central to our model then
arises endogenously. Focusing on the case where the own division biases are small, we further show
that centralized decision-making is preferred to decentralized decision-making if and only if pro-
duction decisions are su¢ ciently complementary. This result stands in sharp contrast with Alonso
et al. (2008) who show that decentralization is always optimal when the own division bias is small.
If production decisions are strategic substitutes, in contrast, we conrm the qualitative results in
Alonso et al. (2008).
2 Literature Review
Our paper builds on a growing theoretical literature in organizational economics that examines the
relationship between a rms organizational structure and its ability to coordinate decisions across
divisions and other sub-units. Coordination requires the aggregation of dispersed information but is
imperfect because of physical communication constraints (Aoki 1986, Hart and Moore 2005, Dessein
and Santos 2006, and Cremer et al. 2007) or because sub-unit managers are biased and communicate
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strategically (Alonso et al. 2008, Rantakari 2008, Dessein et al. 2010, Friebel and Raith 2010).2
A key argument in this literature is that a centralized structure is better at coordinating decisions,
while a decentralized one is better at adapting decisions to the circumstances and opportunities of
di¤erent sub-units.
We add to this literature in a number of ways. First, we show that despite division managers
being better informed about their own local circumstances, a central structure can be better at
adapting to those circumstances than a decentralized one. Our model shares with Alonso et al.
(2008) that decision making can be decomposed into autonomous adaptation and coordinated adap-
tation and that coordinated adaptation can be best achieved in a centralized structure. In Alonso
et al. (2008), however, a decentralized organization is always more adaptive to local information
than a centralized one (see Lemma 2 in that paper). Moreover, that paper does not mention or
analyze the benets of coordinated adaptation which, in fact, are dominated by other factors that
a¤ect adaptation, such as incentive conicts. By abstracting from incentive conicts, the present
model claries and emphasizes that centralization can be the optimal organizational structure for
purely adaptive/informational reasons. Second, many of the above papers, and a number of recent
papers in other elds, model the need for adaptation and coordination by assuming a particular
payo¤ function.3 In contrast, we derive the payo¤ function by explicitly modeling the production
interdependencies and the variability in demand that create the need for adaptation and coordi-
nation. This approach allows us to examine the impact of the intensity of competition and the
external environment of the rm on its internal organization.
By linking the intensity of competition to the choice between centralization and decentralization,
we also relate to a literature that studies the impact of competition on organizational features of
rms. Most of this literature examines how competition a¤ects managers incentives to reduce
costs both directlyfor given incentive schemesand indirectlyby changing the managersincentive
schemes (Schmidt 1997, Raith 2003, Vives 2008). Closest to us, Raith (2003) shows that the e¤ect of
competition on managerial incentives depends on how it a¤ects the level and the price sensitivity of
demand. In his model, an increase in price sensitivity makes low marginal costs more important and
thus favors high powered incentives. Similarly, in our setting, an increase in price sensitivity makes
it more important that the rm adapts to demand shocks but also makes production decisions
2More generally, the literature on team theory examines decision making in rms in the presence of informational
constraints. See Van Zandt (1999) for an overview.
3See, for example, Morris and Shin (2002), Dessein and Santos (2006), Alonso et al. (2008), Rantakari (2008),
Calvó-Armengol et al. (2011), Bolton et al. (2013), and Hagenbach and Koessler (2010).
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more interdependent. As a result, such an increase in price sensitivity favors centralization. Raith
(2003) and our paper therefore both identify the same channel through which competition a¤ects
organizational design but examine a di¤erent organizational design variable.4
3 The Model
A multi-divisional rm consists of two operating divisions and one headquarters. Division j = 1; 2
produces a single good and sells it in Market j. Each division is a monopolist in its market and
headquarters does not engage in any production.
The costs of Division j = 1; 2 are given by
cqj + gq1q2; (1)
where c  0, g 2 ( 1; 1), and q1 and q2 are the production levels of Divisions 1 and 2. If g > 0,
an increase in production by one division increases the average and marginal costs of the other
division. Such negative cost externalities may arise, for instance, because of the utilization of
common services, such as personnel and IT departments and managerial supervision and know-
how. If, instead, g < 0, then an increase in production by one division reduces the average and
marginal costs of the other division. Such positive cost externalities may arise, for instance, because
of learning and scale e¤ects in the production of inputs used by both divisions.
The inverse demand function in Market j = 1; 2 is given by
pj = + j   1
b
qj , (2)
where b > 0 is the price sensitivity of demand jdqj=dpj j. Demand shocks 1 and 2 are indepen-
dently drawn from a distribution with zero mean and variance 2. To avoid cumbersome corner
solutions, we assume that the intercept  + j is always su¢ ciently large for production to take
place in both markets.
Given cost functions (1) and inverse demand functions (2), prots of Divisions j = 1; 2 are given
by
j (q1; q2) =

+ j   1
b
qj   c  gqk

qj , where k 6= j : (3)
4 In addition, Raith (2003) identies a scale e¤ect, where a lower level of demand reduces the benets of lower
marginal costs. The level of demand plays no role in our model.
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We denote overall rm prots by  (q1; q2) = 1 (q1; q2) + 2 (q1; q2) and expected prots by
(q1; q2) = E [ (q1; q2)]. Whenever it does not cause any confusion, we simplify notation by
omitting the production levels. For instance, we sometimes denote expected prots simply by .
There are three managers: the headquarter manager, who is in charge of headquarters, and
Division Managers 1 and 2, who are in charge of Divisions 1 and 2 respectively. The managers are
risk neutral and care about overall rm prots. They di¤er, however, in terms of the information
that is available to them. In particular, we assume that the headquarter manager is a generalist
with broad but shallow information while the division managers are specialists with deep but
narrow information: Division Manager j = 1; 2 knows more than any other manager does about
the demand conditions in Market j, while the headquarter manager knows more than Division
Manager j does about the demand conditions in Market k 6= j. Formally, Division Manager
j = 1; 2 privately observes signal privj about the demand conditions in Market j. Both division
managers also observe signals div1 and div2 about the demand conditions in Markets 1 and 2,
where div stands for division managers. Finally, the headquarter manager observes signals
headj about the demand conditions in Market j, where headstands for headquarter manager.
This information structure is summarized in Figures 1a and 1b. We endogenize the signals divj and
headj in Section 6.5
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
We refer to Division Manager js information about the demand conditions in Market j = 1; 2
as his local information and we denote it by locj = (privj , divj). We can then measure the
depth of the division managersinformation with the residual variance
Vd  E
h
(j   E [j jlocj ])2
i
,
where the subscript d stands for depth.Similarly, we measure the breadth of their information
with the residual variance
Vb  E
h
(j   E [j jdivj ])2
i
,
where the subscript b stands for breadth. If division managers have no information about the
demand conditions in each othersmarkets, for instance, then the residual variance Vb is equal to
5 It follows that what Manager 2 knows about Market 2 is a su¢ cient statistic to knowing what Manager 1 knows
about Market 2. This simplies the analysis and corresponds to the signal structure which arises endogenously under
cheap talk, as analyzed in Section 6. If this were not to be the case, Manager 2 would need to worry about Manager
1s knowledge and exact response. We conjecture that this would further complicate coordinated adaptation (see
Section 4), and hence strengthen the case for centralized adaptation.
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the variance 2. And if division managers are perfectly informed about the demand conditions in
their own markets, then Vd = 0. Since each division manager knows more about his market than
he does about the other market, we have that Vd  Vb.
In contrast to the division managers, the headquarter manager is equally well informed about
the demand conditions in both markets. In particular, after receiving signals head1 and head2, the
headquarter managers residual variance about the demand conditions in Market j = 1; 2 equals
V  E
h
(j   E [j jheadj ])2
i
.
To capture the assumption that the headquarter is a generalist and the division managers
specialists, we assume that
Vd < V < Vb:
Compared to Division Manager j = 1; 2, the headquarter manager therefore knows less about the
demand conditions in Market j but more about those in Market k 6= j.
To model the rms organizational choice, we assume that the two goods that the rm produces
are so complex that they cannot be fully described in a written contract, neither ex ante nor ex
post.6 Note that this also rules out contracts on the price and the quantity of the goods. The
only organizational choice that the rm can make is therefore the allocation of decision rights. We
focus on three organizational structures: Centralization, Divisional Centralization, and Decentral-
ization. Under Centralization both production decisions q1 and q2 are made by the headquarter
manager and under Divisional Centralization they are both made by Division Manager 1. Under
Decentralization, in contrast, production decisions q1 and q2 are made by Division Managers 1 and
2 respectively.
Finally, the timing is as follows. First, decision rights are allocated to maximize expected
prots. Second, the managers learn their information. Third, the decision makers decide on the
production levels. Finally, prots are realized and the game ends.
Before we move on to solve this model, it is useful to discuss some of the main assumptions.
One key assumption is that the division managersinformation is taken as given. Implicitly we
are therefore ruling out e¢ cient communication between the division managers. We endogenize
communication and thus the information structure in Section 6.
6For ex ante non-contractibility, see for instance, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). For ex
post non-contractiblility, see, among others, Aghion et al. (2004).
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Another key assumption is that managers only care about overall rm prots. We abstract
from incentive conicts to focus on the role of information in the managersability to adapt to
demand shocks.
Throughout the paper we assume that the demand shocks in the two markets are independent.
In principle we could allow for the demand shocks to be correlated. Doing so, however, would only
obscure the di¤erence between depth and breadth that is at the heart of our results. We therefore
deliberately focus on independent demand shocks.
Another assumption that we maintain throughout the paper is that the externalities the divi-
sions impose on each other are on the cost side rather than on the demand side. Notice, however,
that the prot functions (3) could be generated in a model with constant marginal costs and linear
demand functions in which the two goods are imperfect substitutes or complements. A model with
demand externalities of this type is therefore identical to ours.
Finally, given our focus on cost externalities, it is natural to assume that the decision makers
set quantities and not prices. Notice, however, that since the divisions are monopolists, setting
prices is equivalent to setting quantities. Moreover, since we allow for both positive and negative
cost externalities, the production decisions can be either strategic complements or substitutes.
4 Adaptation and the Depth and Breadth of Information
To solve the model, we rst examine decision making, adaptation, and the rms performance
under Decentralization. In the nal sub-section we then derive the expected prots under the two
centralized structures and determine the optimal organizational structure.
4.1 Decision Making
Suppose that the rm is decentralized. After the division managers have observed their signals,
they simultaneously decide on the production levels that maximize expected prots. Taking
expectations over prots (3) and di¤erentiating, we nd that the reaction functions are given by
q1 =
b
2
(  c+ E [1 jloc1 ])  tE [q2 jdiv ] (4)
and
q2 =
b
2
(  c+ E [2 jloc2 ])  tE [q1 jdiv ] ; (5)
where t  gb and where div = (div1; div2) are the signals that are observed by both division
managers. To make the right decision, each division manager therefore has to predict both his
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local demand conditions and the decision that the other division manager is going to make. Note
that his ability to predict his local demand condition depends on the depth of his information while
his ability to predict the other decision depends on its breadth.
In what follows, the parameter t plays an important role. Notice that the sign of t determines
whether the production decisions are strategic complements or substitutes and that the absolute
value of t measures the degree of interdependence between the production decisions. Notice also
that the degree of interdependence jtj is increasing in the price sensitivity of demand b, which
will be important for what follows below. To see why this is the case, consider Figures 2a and
2b. In each gure, the at lines are Division 1s marginal costs for di¤erent production levels by
Division 2. And the downward sloping lines are Division 1s inverse demand and marginal revenue
functions, drawn for less price sensitive demand in Figure 2a and for more price sensitive demand
in Figure 2b. The gures show that the more price sensitive demand is, the larger is the impact of
a change in Division 1s marginal costscaused by a change in production by Division 2on Division
1s optimal production level.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Next we can solve reaction functions (4) and (5) to nd the decision rules
q1 = b
  c
2 (1 + t)
+

b
2
E [1 jloc1 ] + bttE [1 jdiv1 ]  E [2 jdiv2 ]
1  t2

(6)
and
q2 = b
  c
2 (1 + t)
+

b
2
E [2 jloc2 ] + bttE [2 jdiv2 ]  E [1 jdiv1 ]
1  t2

; (7)
where we are abusing notation somewhat by using q1 and q2 to denote both the production levels
and the decision rules. The rst term on the RHS of each expression is the average production level
q  E [q1] = E [q2]. The second term is then the di¤erence between actual and average production
and thus captures the extent to which division managers adapt to demand shocks. Since the
division managers are unbiased, they always make the rst best decision on average. The rms
performance therefore depends only on how well the division managers adapt to demand shocks.
4.2 Adaptation
To examine how the division managers adapt to demand shocks, suppose that there is a positive
demand shock in Market 1 but not in Market 2. In particular, suppose that 1 =  for some  > 0
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and 2 = 0. Also, and without loss of generality, suppose that there are negative cost externalities,
that is, g > 0. From (6) and (7) it follows that the expected changes in production are then given
by
E [q1   q j1 = ] = E

b
2
E [1 jloc1 ] + b
2
t2
1  t2E [1 jdiv1 ] j1 = 

(8)
and
E [q2   q j1 = ] =   b
2
t
1  t2E [E [1 jdiv1 ] j1 = ] : (9)
To interpret these expressions, suppose rst that the division managers are perfectly informed
about the demand conditions. We can then illustrate the above production changes in Figure 3a,
where the solid lines are the reaction functions (4) and (5) if 1 = 2 = 0 and the dashed line is
Division Manager 1s reaction function if 1 =  and 2 = 0. The above production changes then
correspond to a move from A to C in the gure.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Notice that the overall changes in production are the sum of two components. The rst
component is the change in production by Division Manager 1, holding constant the decision by
Division Manager 2. It is given by the rst term on the RHS of (8) and it corresponds to a move
from A to B in Figure 3a. Since this component does not require any coordination between the
division managers, it depends only on how much Division Manager 1 knows about the demand
conditions in his own market. As such, it captures the notion of autonomous adaptation that
we discussed in the Introduction.
The second component, in contrast, is the additional change in production that is due to each
division manager adapting production by his division to changes in production by the other, and
thus captures the notion of coordinated adaptation. It is given by the second term on the
RHS of (8) and the only term on the RHS of (9) and it corresponds to a move from B to C in
Figure 3a. Notice that these terms depend only on how much Division Manager 2 knows about
the demand conditions in Market 1. The division managers ability to engage in coordinated
adaptation therefore depends on the breadth of their information while their ability to engage in
autonomous adaptation depends on their depth.
The decomposition of the overall change in production into autonomous and coordinated adap-
tation highlights that coordination is an input into adaptation that allows the division managers
to adapt to demand shocks more aggressively. Moreover, the more interdependent the production
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decisions, the more important coordinated adaptationand thus breadthbecomes relative to au-
tonomous adaptationand thus depth. To see this, notice that Division Manager 1s coordinated
responsethe second term on the RHS of (8)is the product of his autonomous response and the
term t2=(1  t2), which is increasing in jtj. The larger jtj is, therefore, the larger Division Manager
1s coordinated response is relative to his autonomous response.
This last observation is also illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b. In Figure 3a the reaction
functions were drawn for a smaller g (and thus a smaller t  gb) and in Figure 3b they are drawn
for a larger g. The gures show that while autonomous adaptation is the same for either value
of g, coordinated adaptation is larger, the larger is g. The more interdependent the production
decisions are , therefore, the more adaptation depends on the division managersability to adapt
to demand shocks in a coordinated fashionand thus the breadth of their informationthan their
ability to adapt to them autonomouslyand thus the depth of their information.
4.3 Organizational Performance
Since decision rules q1 and q2 in (6) and (7) are linear in the conditional expectations we can write
expected prots (q1; q2) as
(q1; q2) =  (q; q) +  (q1   q; q2   q) : (10)
The rst term on the RHS are the rigid protsthe rms expected prots if it does not adapt
production to demand shocksand the second term is the gains from adaptationthe additional
prots the rm expects to realize if it does adapt production to demand shocks. If the division
managers were perfectly informed about the demand conditions in both markets we would have
(q1; q

2) =
b (  c)2
2 (1 + t)
+
b2
2 (1  t2) ; (11)
where q1 and q2 are the rst best decision rules. Notice that the gains from adaptation are increasing
in the variability of demand as measured by the variance 2. To the extent that the rm can adapt
production to demand shocks, it therefore benets from more demand variability. Moreover, the
more price sensitive demand is, that is, the larger b is, the more the rm benets from demand
variability. This reects the standard intuition that the more price sensitive demand is, the more
important it becomes for the rm to adapt production to demand shocks. We will return to this
intuition when we discuss competition below.
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We can now write expected prots as
(q1; q2) =  (q

1; q

2) 
b
2

Vd +
t2
1  t2Vb

: (12)
Recall that the division managers make the rst best decisions on average and thus realize rst best
rigid prots. The second term on the RHS of the above expression is therefore the di¤erence in the
rst best and the actual gains from adaptation. This term reects our two key insights from the
previous section. First, the division managersability to adapt to demand shocks depends on both
the depth and the breadth of their information. Second, the more interdependent the production
decisions are, the more important is the division managers ability to adapt in a coordinated
fashionand thus the breadth of their informationrelative to their ability to adapt to demand
shocks autonomouslyand thus the depth of their information.
4.4 The Optimal Organizational Structure
So far we have focused on Decentralization. Since the organizational structures only di¤er in
terms of the decision makersinformation, however, we can use the expressions we derived above to
characterize the two centralized organizations. Consider, for instance, Centralization, in which case
both decisions are made by the headquarter manager. Since the headquarter manager only receives
one signal for each market, we can derive her decision rules by substituting headj for both locj and
divj in the decision rules (6) and (7). Similarly, we can obtain expected prots by substituting
V for both Vd and Vb in (12). The di¤erence in expected prots between Centralization and
Decentralization are therefore given by
D  C = b
2

(V   Vd)  t
2
1  t2 (Vb   V )

; (13)
where Cand Dindicate Centralizationand Decentralization. The two terms in the squared
brackets represent the costs and benets of decentralization: on the one hand, the division man-
agers know more about their markets and are therefore better at adapting to demand shocks au-
tonomously; on the other hand, however, the headquarter manager knows more than each division
manager does about the other market and is therefore better at coordinating her responses. As
anticipated, the costs of decentralization outweigh the benets if the degree of interdependence is
su¢ ciently large. Indeed, no matter how large the division managers advantage in terms of depth
V   Vd > 0, and how small the headquarter managers advantage in terms of breadth Vb   V > 0,
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there exists a critical level of interdependence above which the centralized structure is better at
adapting to demand shocks than the decentralized one.
Consider next Divisional Centralization. We can obtain the decision rules under this organi-
zational structure by substituting loc1 for div1 and div2 for loc2 in the decision rules (6) and (7).
Moreover, it is routine to show that the di¤erence in expected prots between Decentralization and
Divisional Centralization is then given by
D  DC = b
4
(Vb   Vd)

1  t
2
1  t2

: (14)
As in the comparison between Centralization and Decentralization, therefore, the centralized struc-
ture, in this case Divisional Centralization, outperforms the decentralized one if the production
decisions are su¢ ciently interdependent. Since the division managers dont di¤er in terms of the
depth and breadth of their information, however, the di¤erence in the residual variances now does
not a¤ect the choice between the two organizational structures.
The only remaining issue then is the choice between Centralization and Divisional Centraliza-
tion. From (13) and (14), the di¤erence in expected prots between these two organizational
structures is given by
DC  C = b
4
1
1  t2 [(V   Vd)  (Vb   V )] :
Once again, therefore, Centralization outperforms the alternative, in this case Divisional Centraliza-
tion, if the headquarter managers advantage in terms of breadth outweighs the division managers
advantage in terms of depth. The degree of interdependence, however, now does not a¤ect the
choice between the two organizational structures. The reason is that both managers are equally
good at coordinated adaptation since each now controls both decisions. The headquarter manager,
however, is better at adapting q2 to 2 autonomously because of his breadth of information, whereas
Manager 1 is better at adapting q1 to 1 autonomously because of his depth of information. Cen-
tralization therefore outperforms Divisional Centralization if and only if the headquarter managers
advantage in terms of breadth outweighs the division managers advantage in terms of depth, that
is, if and only if
Vb   V > V   Vd. (15)
An interpretation of this condition is that there are decreasing returns to knowledge special-
ization, which is a feature of most commonly used information technologies, such as drawing inde-
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pendent signals to learn about a random variable.7 For the remainder of this paper, we therefore
assume that (15) holds and abstract from Divisional Centralization. Notice, however, that even
if (15) does not hold, it is still the case that a centralized structure outperforms the decentralized
one if the production decisions are su¢ ciently interdependent. The only di¤erence is that the
centralized structure then refers to Divisional Centralization rather than Centralization and that
the critical degree of interdependence does not depend on the depth and the breadth of the decision
makersinformation. We can now summarize the previous discussion in our main proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. If (15) holds, then Centralization is optimal if
t2
1  t2 >
V   Vd
Vb   V
and Decentralization is optimal otherwise. If (15) does not hold, then Divisional Centralization is
optimal if
t2
1  t2 > 1
and Decentralization is optimal otherwise.
As anticipated, a centralized structure is better at adapting to changes in the environment
than a decentralized one when decisions are su¢ ciently interdependent. As such, the model sheds
light on the debate about the relative performance of centralized and decentralized organizations in
adapting to changes in the environment. It captures both the importance of coordinated adaptation
stressed by Barnard and Williamson as well as that of autonomous adaptation stressed by Hayek
and others. And it formalizes Williamsons intuition that, overall, The authority relationship
(at) has adaptive advantages over autonomy for transactions of the bilaterally (or multi-laterally)
dependent kind.
5 Competition and Adaptation
To explore some of the implications of the result we derived in the previous section, we now examine
the e¤ect of an increase in competition on the rms organizational structure. As discussed in
the Introduction, we argue that an increase in competition does not only make adaptation more
important. Instead, it also changes how a rm adapts to demand shocks, putting relatively more
7 Indeed, one can think of each manager being able to take a xed number of draws to learn about Market 1 or
Market 2. Additional draws then typically reduce the residual variance less than initial draws. This will be the case,
for example, if both the signals and the random variables are normally distributed.
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weight on coordinated adaptation than on autonomous adaptation. As a result, an increase in
competition actually favors a centralized structure over a decentralized one.
In general, there are many channels through which competition can a¤ect the behavior of rms.
In line with much of the Industrial Organization literature and, in particular, the literature on the
e¤ect of competition on the power of managerial incentives and innovation, we focus on the e¤ect
of competition on demand (see, for instance, Raith 2003 and Vives 2008). It is well known that
an increase in competition can shift rms inverse demand functions downwards, or it can make
demand more price sensitive, or both (Vives 2008). In this section, we therefore explore how the
di¤erence in expected prots between Centralization and Decentralization depend on the average
intercept of the inverse demand functions  and on the price sensitivity of demand b. In Appendix
A we then provide micro-foundations for this reduced-form approach by modeling competition
explicitly and conrming thatdepending on its underlying causescompetition either reduces ,
increases b, or both.
From the previous section it is immediate that a reduction in  alone does not a¤ect the
di¤erence in expected prots between Centralization and Decentralization (13). Such a reduction
does diminish the rms rigid prots. But since rigid prots are equal to rst best under both
organizational structures it does not a¤ect their relative performance. In our setting, an increase
in competition can therefore only a¤ect the rms organization if it makes demand more price
sensitive.
Consider then the e¤ect of an increase in the price sensitivity of demand b. Di¤erentiating the
di¤erence in expected prots (13) we have that
d
 
D  C
db
=
@
 
D  C
@b
+
d
 
D  C
dt
dt
db
;
where the rst term on the RHS is the direct e¤ect and the second is the indirect e¤ect
that works through t. The direct e¤ect captures the standard intuition that an increase the
price sensitivity of demand makes adaptation more important and thus favors the organizational
structure that is better at adapting to demand shocks. In particular, it follows from (13) that we
can write the direct e¤ect as
@
 
D  C
@b
=
1
b
 
D  C :
The direct e¤ect therefore magnies the di¤erence in expected prots between the two organiza-
tional structures. Notice, however, that it does not a¤ect the di¤erence in expected prots for a
16
marginal rm that is just indi¤erent between Centralization and Decentralization. As such, the
direct e¤ect does not a¤ect the choice between the two organizational structures. This choice
therefore depends only on the indirect e¤ect of an increase in the price sensitivity.
To understand the indirect e¤ect, recall that an increase in the price sensitivity of demand b
increases the degree of interdependence jtj = jgbj. From our discussion above, it then immediately
follows that an increase in the price sensitivity favors coordinated adaptation and breadth over
autonomous adaptation and depth. Formally, the indirect e¤ect is given by
d
 
D  C
dt
dt
db
=   t
2
(1  t2)2 (Vb   V ) < 0 for all t 6= 0.
For a marginal rm, the overall e¤ect of an increase on the price sensitivity of demand is then to
make the centralized structure strictly more protable than the decentralized one. We therefore
have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. An increase in competition that increases the price sensitivity of demand
can result in a shift from Decentralization to Centralization but not the reverse. An increase in
competition that does not a¤ect the price sensitivity of demand has no e¤ect on the rms choice
between Centralization and Decentralization.
A few empirical studies examine the e¤ect of competition on the delegation of decision rights
to managers of manufacturing plants and nd a positive relationship (see, for instance, Colombo
and Delmastro 2004 and Bloom et al. 2010). The delegation of decision rights to the manager of a
manufacturing plant, however, is conceptually di¤erent from the delegation of decision rights from
headquarters to a division managers, as studied in this paper. For example, more intense compe-
tition may make cost reductions more important relative to innovation and brand di¤erentiation.
This, in turn, may make it optimal to shift control rights from the marketing and brand managers
to plant managers in charge of manufacturing.8 Delegation may also speed up decision-making, as
in Aoki (1986). This aspect of delegation is absent from our framework, but may make delegation
more attractive in a more competitive environment.
While not directly touching on the impact of competition on organizational structure, Guadalupe,
Li and Wulf (2013) provide suggestive evidence that large US rms have become more centralized
8 In contrast to a plant manager, a division manager has prot and loss responsibility and is typically in charge
of coordinating sales, marketing and manufacturing for a product or product range. As documented by Bushman et
al. (1995), division managers typically report to a group manager or a COO (Chief Operating O¢ cer), who has the
responsibility for coordinating multiple divisions and can be seen as headquarters in our model. In large organizations,
several layers of group managers may exist, with higher-level group managers coordinating the decisions of several
lower-level group managers (who in turn coordinate the decisions of several division managers) .
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in recent decades. They document a phenomenon termed functional centralization,where more
functional managers (e.g. marketing and R&D specialists) join the executive team surrounding the
CEO and where the responsibilities of division managers are reduced (as reected in lower pay for
the divisional managers). As an example, they discuss IBM in the mid 1990s when the new CEO,
Lou Gerstner, centralized select functional activities to move away from the balkanized IBM of
the early 1990s.9 Lou Gerstner, for instance, appointed a Chief Marketing O¢ cer who controlled
many of the marketing activities across the various business units. Another example is Procter &
Gamble which, in 1989, shifted towards a matrix organization that included functional senior vice
presidents to manage functions across business units. While there are many plausible reasons for
why IBM and Procter & Gamble may have centralized authority, both organizations were operating
in industries that became increasingly competitive.
6 Strategic Communication
In this section we extend our main model by allowing for incentive conicts and strategic com-
munication. To do so, we draw upon the approach in Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008)
by assuming that division managers are biased towards their own divisions and communicate their
private information using cheap talk. The headquarter manager, in contrast, remains unbiased but
observes no private information. We use this version of the model to show that strategic communica-
tion can give rise to the generalist-specialist information structure that is central to our model, even
when there are neither economies to knowledge specialization nor cognitive constraints. Focusing
on the case where the own divisions biases are small, we further show that centralized decision-
making is preferred to decentralized decision-making whenever production decisions are su¢ ciently
complementary. This result stands in sharp contrast with Alonso et al. (2008) who show that
decentralization is always optimal when the own division bias is small. If production decisions are
strategic substitutes, in contrast, we conrm the qualitative results in Alonso et al. (2008).
6.1 Allowing for Incentive Conicts and Strategic Communication
Specically, we make two changes to the model that we explored above. First, we now assume
that the division managers are biased towards their own divisions. In particular, Division Manager
j = 1; 2 maximizes j + (1  )k, where k 6= j and where  2 [1=2; 1] is Division Manager js
9Gerstner, Louis, Jr., Who Says Elephants Cant Dance, Harper Collins, New York, p. 77, 2002, cited by
Guadalupe et al. (2012).
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own-division bias. In contrast to the division managers, the headquarter manager continues to
care about overall prots. We follow the modelling approach in Alonso et al. (2008) and assume
that these preferences are exogenously given.
Second, we now assume that after the rm has decided between Centralization, Divisional Cen-
tralization, and Decentralization, Division Manager j = 1; 2 observes private signal privj = j ,
where 1 and 2 are independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support [ s; s], where
s > 0. The division managers are therefore perfectly informed about the demand conditions in their
respective markets and, as a result, the residual variance Vd is equal to zero. Next, the division
managers engage in one round of cheap talk communication. In particular, under Decentralization,
Division Manager j = 1; 2 sends message divj 2 M to Division Manager k 6= j, where the mes-
sage space M is the support of their private information [ s; s] : Under Divisional Centralization,
Division Manager 2 sends message divDC2 2 M to Division Manager 1. Similarly, under Central-
ization, Division Managers 1 and 2 simultaneously send messages head1 2 M and head2 2 M to
headquarters. The breadth of the division managers information under Decentralization Vb; and
under Divisional Centralization V DCb ; is now endogenously determined by the quality of horizontal
communication. Similarly, the depth and the breadth of the headquarter managers information V
is endogenously determined by the quality of vertical communication. The generalist-specialist
information structure then arises if and only if 0 < V < minfVb; V DCb g.
Next we informally discuss the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game. The formal analysis
is in Appendix B.
6.2 The Generalist-Specialist Information Structure
Consider rst decision making for given posteriors about the demand conditions. The division
managersbias does not a¤ect decision making under Centralization. To obtain the decision rules
under Decentralization, we simply need to substitute   t= (2) for t in the decision rules (6) and
(7). In terms of decision making, the only e¤ect of the own-division bias is therefore to reduce the
weight that the division managers put on the interdependence between their decisions. Finally, we
can obtain the decision rules under Divisional Centralization by rst substituting  for t in reaction
function (4) and =(1  ) for t in (5), and then solving for the equilibrium decision rules.10
To derive the posteriors on which the decision rules are based, consider next the communication
sub-game. It follows from Crawford and Sobel (1982) that all equilibria of the communication sub-
10We provide details of these calculations in the proof of Lemma 1.
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game are partition equilibria in which the state space is partitioned into a nite number of intervals
and the division managers only indicate which interval their demand conditions fall into. Formally,
in a partition equilibrium, the state space for Market j = 1; 2 is partitioned into (aj0, a
j
1, ...; a
j
Nj
),
where N j is the number of intervals and where aj0 =    s and ajNj =  + s. The length of the
intervals is then determined by the di¤erence equation
ai+1   ai = ai   ai 1 + 4bs(ai) for s = C;D;DC; (16)
where bs(ai) is the endogenously determined communication bias. If the absolute size of the
communication bias is equal to or larger than 1=4 for all states j for j = 1; 2, there can only be
a single interval. In this case, the only communication equilibrium is the babbling one. If the
absolute size of the communication bias is less than 1=4 for some states, however, there can be
multiple equilibria that di¤er in the number of intervals. We follow the literature by focusing on
the most informative communication equilibrium in which the number of intervals is maximized.
To characterize the most informative equilibrium, we rst need to characterize the communica-
tion biases under the three organizational structures, which we do in the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. (i.) Under Centralization, the communication bias exists and is given by
bC = (t  ) (  c) ; (17)
with sign(bC) = sign(t). If
bC  1=4, informative communication is not feasible.
(ii.) Under Decentralization, if (2  1)2 <  1  t2, then the communication bias exists and is
given by
bD (j) = 2 (t  ) (+ j   c)   (  c)
2(1  t2)  (t  )2 ; (18)
where bD (j) is always positive: If (2  1)2 
 
1  t2, the communication bias does not exist,
and informative communication is not feasible.
(iii.) Under Divisional Centralization, the communication bias exists and is given by
bDC (2) = (t  )
(+ 2   c)  1 2t  (  c)
(1  )

   1 2t 
 ; (19)
with sign(bDC) = sign(t):
Notice that under Centralization the communication bias is constant. The communication
equilibria under this organizational structure are therefore as in the well-known constant bias
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example in Crawford and Sobel (1982). Under both Decentralization and Divisional Centralization,
instead, the communication bias depends on the realization of the state j for j = 1; 2. Under
these organizational structures, the communication equilibria are therefore more similar to those in
Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), where the communication bias is also state dependent.11
We will see below that di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of communication across organizational
structures depend crucially on di¤erences between the communication biases. One key di¤erence
is that under the two centralized structures the sign of the bias depends on whether decisions are
strategic substitutes or complements while under the decentralized structure the bias always has
the same sign. To understand why this is the case, consider rst Decentralization. A division
manager would then like to induce less production by his counterpart if decisions are strategic
substitutes and he would like to induce more production if decisions are strategic complements.
In either case, he can do so by convincing his counterpart thatbecause of very favorable demand
conditions in his own markethe will increase production himself. Under Decentralization, division
managers therefore always have an incentive to over-report the demand conditions in their markets,
which is why bD (j) is always positive.
This is not the case under the centralized structures. To see why, consider the incentives of a
division manager to misrepresent the demand conditions in his market under Centralization (the
argument for Divisional Centralization is analogous). Importantly, any such misrepresentation now
a¤ects production by both divisions. Holding constant production by the division managers own
division, the incentives to misrepresent the demand conditions in his market are similar to those
under Decentralization. Holding constant production by the other division, however, the division
manager would like to induce more production when decisions are strategic substitutes and less when
they are strategic complements. The reason is that headquarters puts more weight on the externality
generated by the divisions production. If decisions are strategic substitutes, the division manager
therefore has an unambiguous incentive to over-report the demand conditions in his market. If
decisions are strategic complements, however, the division manager faces countervailing incentives,
where the net e¤ect is that he would want to under-report the demand conditions in his market.
Having characterized the communication biases, we can now examine the e¢ ciency of commu-
nication under the di¤erent organizational structures.
11 In contrast to those models, however, in our setting the communication biases bD (j) and bDC (2) are never
equal to zero, that is, there is never a point of congruence between the sender and the receiver under Decentralization
or Divisional Centralization. As a result, the maximum number of partitions is always nite, which complicates the
derivation of the residual variance.
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LEMMA 2. (i.) Suppose that t < 0. Then for any  > 1=2 we have V  Vb with strict inequality
whenever V < 2.
(ii.) There exists a critical value t > 0 and an " > 0 such that for  2 (1=2; 1=2 + ") we have:
(a.) V < V DCb for t 2 ( 1; 1) and (b.) V < Vb if and only if t < t.
The lemma provides conditions under which the generalist-specialist information structure arises
endogenously and we illustrate them in Figure 4. The rst part of the lemma focuses on Cen-
tralization and Decentralization and shows that such a generalist-specialist structure then arises
endogenously when decisions are strategic complements. The reason is that, as we just saw, the
division managers face countervailing incentives when they communicate with headquarters under
Centralization but not when they communicate with each other under Decentralization. As a result,
communication under Centralization is more e¢ cient than communication under Decentralization,
generating a generalist-specialist information structure for any own-division bias .
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
The second part of the lemma compares communication under all three organizational structures
when incentive conicts are small. It shows that communication under Centralization is always
more e¢ cient than communication under Divisional Centralization. And it shows that communica-
tion under Centralization is more e¢ cient than communication under Decentralization even when
decisions are strategic substitutes, provided that the interdependency is not too strong. For small
incentive conicts, the generalist-specialist information structure therefore arises endogenously even
once we allow for all three organizational structures, provided that strategic substitutability is not
too strong.
To understand why the generalist-specialist information structure does not arise when the strate-
gic substitutability is su¢ ciently strong, recall our discussion above of the communication bias.
There we saw that when decisions are strategic substitutes, division managers have an incentive
to over-report their demand conditions, both to increase production by their own division and to
reduce production by the other division. Because of these reinforcing incentives, division managers
actually share less information with headquarters than with each other. As a result, the division
managers information under Decentralization is then both deeper and broader than that of the
headquarter manager under Centralization.
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6.3 The Optimal Organizational Structure
The next question is whether the headquarter managers unbiased decision making and endoge-
nous advantage in terms of breadth can outweigh the division managers endogenous advantage
in terms of depth. With biased division managers, the di¤erence in expected prots between
Decentralization and Centralization is given by
D  C =   b (t  )
2
2 (1 + t) (1 + )2
(  c)2   b (t  )2
 
1  t2+ (t+ )2
2 (1  2)2 (1  t2)
 
2   Vb

(20)
+
b
2

(V   Vd)  t
2
1  t2 (Vb   V )

and the di¤erence in expected prots between Divisional Centralization and Centralization DC  
C is given by
  b
4
(t  )2 (k   2k + 1)
  2k22 + k2 + 1
(k + 1) (1  k2)2 (1  t2) (  c)
2 (21)
  b
4
(t  )2   k  1 + k + 2 (1  3k) (2   Vd) + (1  )  1 + k + k22 (k   3) (2   Vb)
(1  k2)2 (1  t2)
+
b
4
1
1  t2 ((V   Vd)  (Vb   V )) ;
where, k  =(1   ). The rst term of each expression is the di¤erence in rigid prots and the
second and third terms are the di¤erence in the gains from adaptation. Specically, the second
term is the di¤erence in the gains from adaptation that is due to di¤erences in decision making for
given information while the third term is the di¤erence in the gains from adaptation that is due to
di¤erences in information. As such, the rst two terms capture the standard loss of control and the
third captures the gain in information. Since the division managers are biased, the loss of control
is always positive, that is, the rst two terms are always negative. In contrast to standard models
of delegation, however, the gain in information from decentralization may actually be negative.
The reason is that in standard models of delegation, such as Dessein (2002), the agent has more
information than the principal while, in our setting, the agents have di¤erent, but not necessarily
more, information. As a result, decentralization can lead to a loss of information and centralization
can be optimal. The next lemma shows that this can be the case even when the division managers
bias is small, in which case the standard loss of control from decentralization is second order.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that the division managersown-division bias is small. Then Central-
ized decision-making outperforms Decentralization if and only if production decisions are su¢ ciently
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complementary. Formally, there exists a critical value t < 0 such that
(i.) for t < t; there exists an " > 0 such that min

C ;DC
	
> D for  2 (1=2; 1=2 + ")
(ii.) for t > t; there exists an " > 0 such that D  maxC ;DC	 for  2 (1=2; 1=2 + "):
We illustrate the proposition in Figure 5 which also provides additional information about the
level of t. To understand the proposition, consider rst the comparison between Centralization
and Decentralization. To this end, x a particular value of s= (  c) and suppose that t > t, where
t is dened in Lemma 2. From that lemma we know that if t > t communication under Decen-
tralization is more e¢ cient than communication under Centralization. In this case, each division
manager therefore knows more about the demand conditions in both markets than headquarters.
We thus obtain the standard result: the gain in information is positive and dominates the loss of
control, making Decentralization preferable to Centralization. If, instead, t < t, communication
under Centralization is more e¢ cient than communication under Decentralization. As long as
t > t, however, the headquarter managers advantage in terms of breadth is small relative to the
division managersadvantage in terms of depth. Moreover, production decisions are not su¢ ciently
interdependent for the advantage in breadth to matter. As a result, Decentralization is still prefer-
able to Centralization. If t < t, however, communication under Centralization is su¢ ciently
more informative than communication under Decentralization and decisions are su¢ ciently inter-
dependent that the headquarter managers advantage in terms of breadth dominates the division
managersadvantage in terms of depth. Centralization is then preferable to Decentralization, even
though the incentive conict is small.
It is noteworthy that Proposition 3 is qualitatively di¤erent from Proposition 5 in Alonso et
al. (2008), which states that decentralization is always optimal when the own-division bias is
su¢ ciently small. In light of the similarities between the model in this section and that in Alonso
et al. (2008), this suggests that whetherin models of multi-divisional rms in which information is
aggregated via cheap talkdecentralization is optimal for small incentive conicts depends on the
precise nature of externalities between divisions. Intuitively, there are no countervailing incentives
in Alonso et al. (2008) when division managers communicate with headquarters. Hence, strategic
communication is similar in nature to the case of strategic substitutes. While we conrm the results
in Alonso et al. (2008) when decisions are strategic substitutes, we obtain qualitatively di¤erent
results when decisions are complements.12
12See also Alonso (2007) for di¤erences in cheap talk communication when decisions are either complements or
substitutes.
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INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
So far we have focused on the comparison between Centralization and Decentralization. Since
Centralization dominates Decentralization when t < t, we know that a centralized structureeither
Centralization or Divisional Centralizationis optimal in this case. The only remaining question
then is whether, for t > t, Decentralization not only dominates Centralization but also Divisional
Centralization. The proposition shows that this is indeed the case. To understand why, recall
that when  = 1=2 the choice between Centralization and Divisional Centralization only depends
on the di¤erence (V   Vd)   (Vb   V ). In the proof of Lemma 2 we show that for   1=2 the
communication bias under divisional centralization is approximately twice the communication bias
under centralization. To a rst order, we therefore have Vb = 2V and thus (V   Vd) (Vb   V ) = 0:
In other words, di¤erences between Centralization and Divisional Centralization are only second
order for   1=2.13 In contrast, when   1=2 and t > t; Decentralization is preferred over
Centralization to a rst order:14 It follows that Decentralization is then also preferred over Divisional
Centralization.
7 Conclusions
It is widely believed that large, centralized organizations are worse at adapting to changes in the
environment than small, decentralized ones. Gertner and Stillman (2001), for instance, observe
that:
A common belief is that large bureaucratic organizations su¤er from excess inertia and that
a signicant advantage of small organizations is their exibility and ability to adapt. Exactly why
this should be so, however, is rarely explained, nor have economists developed systematic empirical
evidence on the relationship between organizational structure and change(p.418).
The purpose of this paper was to help ll this gap and explore the relationship between orga-
nizational structure and change. We showed that even in a very standard setting, a centralized
structure may actually be better at adaptation than a decentralized one and that this may be
the case even when division managers have superior information about their local conditions and
incentive conicts are negligible. The reason is that if decisions are interdependent, an e¤ective
response to a local shock requires coordinated change. If production is su¢ ciently interdependent,
13Formally, both DC  C = 0 and @(DC  C)=@ = 0 at  = 1=2:
14Formally, while D  C = 0 at  = 1=2; we then have that @(D  C)=@ > 0:
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a headquarter manager with broad but shallow information about each market is then better able
to adapt to local shocks than division managers with deep but narrow information about their re-
spective markets. We then showed that this result reverses some of the standard intuitions about
organizational structure, such as the notions that competition favors decentralization (Section 5)
and that decentralized decision-making ought to be optimal provided that incentive conicts are
su¢ ciently small (Section 6).
One potential application of our model are multi-national enterprises. Such rms are often
multi-divisional rms in which each division is dedicated to a particular country. General Motors,
for instance, started out as a domestic rm that only served the US and Canadian markets. In
the late 1920s, however, it became an early multi-national with di¤erent subunits producing and
selling cars in England, Germany, and other markets. In recent years the role of multi-nationals
in the globalized world economy has been hotly debated among the general public, policy makers,
and academics (see, for instance, Navaretti and Venables 2004). While some see multi-nationals as
catalysts for local economies that transfer know-how and create jobs, others view them as threats to
local wealth and national identities. In spite of this debate and an accompanying surge in research
on multi-nationals, little is known about what determines the horizontal size of multi-nationals.15
When, for instance, does globalization induce multi-nationals to expand into ever more countries?
And when, instead, does it induce them to divest of some of their divisions, as in the recent breakup
of DaimlerChrysler? While our model is explicitly not about the boundaries of multi-divisional
rms, it does suggest channels through which globalization may a¤ect the horizontal size of multi-
nationals. If, for instance, competition makes adaptation more important, and adaptation is more
easily achieved in centralized multi-divisional rms than in stand-alone rms, then competition
may lead to the emergence of new and the expansion of existing multi-nationals. But if, instead,
competition merely reduces externalities between competitors in the same industries, then it may
limit the growth of multi-nationals and even induce them to divest of some of their divisions.
A model of the horizontal boundaries of multi-divisional rms that could conrm or reject these
speculations awaits future research.
15The literature on organizations and international trade focuses on the vertical size of multi-nationals, that is, the
classic make versus buy decision, rather than on their horizontal boundaries (see Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg 2009
for a survey).
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8 Appendix A: Competition and Adaptation
In this appendix, we explicitly model competition and its impact on demand and the rms orga-
nization. For this purpose, we make three changes to the model described in Section 3.
First, we now assume that each division faces a continuum of potential competitors. Each
potential competitor consists of a single division and can only operate in one market. To enter a
market, a competitor has to pay entry costs K  0. We denote the measure of competitors that
enter Market j = 1; 2 by nj . To economize on notation, and without loss of generality, we set the
competitorsproduction costs to zero.
Second, instead of simply assuming the divisionsinverse demand functions, we now derive them
from the underlying parameters. For this purpose, suppose that there is a measure m of consumers
in each market. The utility function of each consumer in Market j = 1; 2 is given by
U = (1 + j) qj +
Z nj
0
qjkdk   1
2

q2j +
Z nj
0
q2jkdk + 2qj
Z nj
0
qjkdk

;
where  2 [0; 1] ; qjk is the amount demanded in Market j of the product of rm k 2 [0; nj ] and qj the
amount demanded of Division js good. We continue to assume that 1 and 2 are independently
drawn from a distribution with mean 0 and variance 2. The utility function implies that in each
market the goods produced by the competitors are perfect substitutes for each other. Moreover,
in each market the goods produced by the competitors are substitutes for the good produced by
the local division, where  measures the degree of substitutability. If  = 0, the goods produced
by the competitors are independent of those produced by the local division, and if  = 1, they are
perfect substitutes.
Finally, we need to change the timing of the game to incorporate the competitors. We continue
to assume that the rm rst decides on its organization and that the rms decision makers then
learn their information and decide on production levels. All potential competitors observe are
the rms production decisions. We make no assumptions about how much the competitors know
about the realization of 1 and 2, or about the rms organization. Each competitor then decides
whether to enter and, if so, how much to produce. Finally, prots are realized and the game ends.
Once again we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game.
In this setting, there are three parameters that determine the degree of competition that the
divisions face: the competitorsentry costs K, market size m, and the degree of substitutability .
Below we explore how changes in these parameters a¤ect the rms organization.
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8.1 Organization and the Firms Performance
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the competitorsproduction and entry
decisions. Then, given the competitors behavior, we can derive the divisions inverse residual
demand functions. We summarize this result in the next lemma.
LEMMA A1. Division j = 1; 2s residual inverse demand function is given by
pj = + j   1
b
qj ; (22)
where
  
 
1 
r
K
m
!
and b  m
1  2 . (23)
Proof: We start by deriving the competitorsproduction and entry decisions. Suppose that the
rm has made production decisions q1 and q2 and that measures n1 and n2 of competitors have
entered the respective markets. The inverse demand function faced by competitor k 2 [0; nj ] in
Market j = 1; 2 is given by
pjk = 1  2
m
qjk   1
m
Qj   
m
qj , (24)
where Qj =
R nj
0 qjkdk is the total amount produced by the competitors in Market j:
Each competitor determines their quantity choice by solving
max
qjk
pjkqjk,
taking as given production of the rm and the other competitors. The rst order condition is given
by
qjk = m  qj  Qj :
Note that this condition does not depend on j . It is therefore irrelevant whether the competitors
observe j or not. Next we integrate over all nj competitors to nd that the total amount produced
by the competitors in Market j is given by
Qj =
nj
nj + 1
[m  qj ] : (25)
Any competitor k that enters Market j thus produces
qjk =
1
nj
Qj =
1
nj + 1
[m  qj ]
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and realizes prots
jk =
[m  qj ]2
m (nj + 1)
2  K:
Finally, setting jk equal to zero and solving for nj we nd that a measure
nj =
1p
mK
h
m  qj  
p
mK
i
of competitors enters Market j. The residual inverse demand function of Division j = 1; 2 charac-
terizes demand for its good given the competitorsbehavior. Substituting the competitorstotal
production (29) in Division js inverse demand (28), we nd that Division js residual inverse
demand is given by (26) and (27). 
8.2 The E¤ect of Competition on Organization
In contrast to our main model, the average intercept of the inverse demand functions  and the
slope parameter b are now functions of the underlying parameters. It follows from (26) and (27)
that a reduction in the competitorsentry costs K reduces the average intercept but does not af-
fect the price sensitivity of demand. In contrast, an increase in market size m or in the degree
of substitutability , leads to an anti-clockwise rotation of the residual inverse demand functions.
In other words, such changes in the environment reduce the average intercept and increase the
price sensitivity. The e¤ect of changes in these parameters on the optimal organizational struc-
ture is summarized in Proposition A1 that translates the ndings in Proposition 2 to our specic
competition model.
PROPOSITION A1. a. A reduction in entry costs K has no e¤ect on the choice between Central-
ization and Decentralization.
b. There exists a critical value of the degree of substitutability  > 0 and a critical value of
the entry costs K > 0 such that for any    and K  K, an increase in market size m can
result in a shift from Decentralization to Centralization but never the reverse.
c. There exists a critical value of the degree of substitutability  < 1 such that for any  
 an increase in the degree of substitutability  can result in a shift from Decentralization to
Centralization but never the reverse.
Proof: Follows from Proposition 1 and our previous discussion of the e¤ect of parameter changes
on (26) and (27). 
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9 Appendix A: Competition and Adaptation
In this appendix, we explicitly model competition and its impact on demand and the rms orga-
nization. For this purpose, we make three changes to the model described in Section 3.
First, we now assume that each division faces a continuum of potential competitors. Each
potential competitor consists of a single division and can only operate in one market. To enter a
market, a competitor has to pay entry costs K  0. We denote the measure of competitors that
enter Market j = 1; 2 by nj . To economize on notation, and without loss of generality, we set the
competitorsproduction costs to zero.
Second, instead of simply assuming the divisionsinverse demand functions, we now derive them
from the underlying parameters. For this purpose, suppose that there is a measure m of consumers
in each market. The utility function of each consumer in Market j = 1; 2 is given by
U = (1 + j) qj +
Z nj
0
qjkdk   1
2

q2j +
Z nj
0
q2jkdk + 2qj
Z nj
0
qjkdk

;
where  2 [0; 1] ; qjk is the amount demanded in Market j of the product of rm k 2 [0; nj ] and qj the
amount demanded of Division js good. We continue to assume that 1 and 2 are independently
drawn from a distribution with mean 0 and variance 2. The utility function implies that in each
market the goods produced by the competitors are perfect substitutes for each other. Moreover,
in each market the goods produced by the competitors are substitutes for the good produced by
the local division, where  measures the degree of substitutability. If  = 0, the goods produced
by the competitors are independent of those produced by the local division, and if  = 1, they are
perfect substitutes.
Finally, we need to change the timing of the game to incorporate the competitors. We continue
to assume that the rm rst decides on its organization and that the rms decision makers then
learn their information and decide on production levels. All potential competitors observe are
the rms production decisions. We make no assumptions about how much the competitors know
about the realization of 1 and 2, or about the rms organization. Each competitor then decides
whether to enter and, if so, how much to produce. Finally, prots are realized and the game ends.
Once again we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game.
In this setting, there are three parameters that determine the degree of competition that the
divisions face: the competitorsentry costs K, market size m, and the degree of substitutability .
Below we explore how changes in these parameters a¤ect the rms organization.
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9.1 Organization and the Firms Performance
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the competitorsproduction and entry
decisions. Then, given the competitors behavior, we can derive the divisions inverse residual
demand functions. We summarize this result in the next lemma.
LEMMA A1. Division j = 1; 2s residual inverse demand function is given by
pj = + j   1
b
qj ; (26)
where
  
 
1 
r
K
m
!
and b  m
1  2 . (27)
Proof: We start by deriving the competitorsproduction and entry decisions. Suppose that the
rm has made production decisions q1 and q2 and that measures n1 and n2 of competitors have
entered the respective markets. The inverse demand function faced by competitor k 2 [0; nj ] in
Market j = 1; 2 is given by
pjk = 1  2
m
qjk   1
m
Qj   
m
qj , (28)
where Qj =
R nj
0 qjkdk is the total amount produced by the competitors in Market j:
Each competitor determines their quantity choice by solving
max
qjk
pjkqjk,
taking as given production of the rm and the other competitors. The rst order condition is given
by
qjk = m  qj  Qj :
Note that this condition does not depend on j . It is therefore irrelevant whether the competitors
observe j or not. Next we integrate over all nj competitors to nd that the total amount produced
by the competitors in Market j is given by
Qj =
nj
nj + 1
[m  qj ] : (29)
Any competitor k that enters Market j thus produces
qjk =
1
nj
Qj =
1
nj + 1
[m  qj ]
and realizes prots
jk =
[m  qj ]2
m (nj + 1)
2  K:
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Finally, setting jk equal to zero and solving for nj we nd that a measure
nj =
1p
mK
h
m  qj  
p
mK
i
of competitors enters Market j. The residual inverse demand function of Division j = 1; 2 charac-
terizes demand for its good given the competitorsbehavior. Substituting the competitorstotal
production (29) in Division js inverse demand (28), we nd that Division js residual inverse
demand is given by (26) and (27). 
9.2 The E¤ect of Competition on Organization
In contrast to our main model, the average intercept of the inverse demand functions  and the
slope parameter b are now functions of the underlying parameters. It follows from (26) and (27)
that a reduction in the competitorsentry costs K reduces the average intercept but does not af-
fect the price sensitivity of demand. In contrast, an increase in market size m or in the degree
of substitutability , leads to an anti-clockwise rotation of the residual inverse demand functions.
In other words, such changes in the environment reduce the average intercept and increase the
price sensitivity. The e¤ect of changes in these parameters on the optimal organizational struc-
ture is summarized in Proposition A1 that translates the ndings in Proposition 2 to our specic
competition model.
PROPOSITION A1. a. A reduction in entry costs K has no e¤ect on the choice between Central-
ization and Decentralization.
b. There exists a critical value of the degree of substitutability  > 0 and a critical value of
the entry costs K > 0 such that for any    and K  K, an increase in market size m can
result in a shift from Decentralization to Centralization but never the reverse.
c. There exists a critical value of the degree of substitutability  < 1 such that for any  
 an increase in the degree of substitutability  can result in a shift from Decentralization to
Centralization but never the reverse.
Proof: Follows from Proposition 1 and our previous discussion of the e¤ect of parameter changes
on (26) and (27). 
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10 Appendix B: Strategic Communication
We divide the proofs for Section 6 into three appendices. Appendix B1 characterizes communication
equilibria and provides the proof of Lemma 1 while Appendix B2 derives expressions for the quality
of horizontal and vertical communication and provides the proof of Lemma 2. Appendix B3 uses
the previous results to study the relative performance of Centralization, Divisional Centralization,
and Decentralization when the own-division bias is vanishingly small and presents the proof of
Proposition 3.
10.1 Appendix B1 - Communication Equilibria
A communication equilibrium under each organizational structure is characterized by (i.) com-
munication rules for the division managers, (ii.) decision rules for the decision makers and (iii.)
belief functions for the message receivers. The communication rule for Manager j = 1; 2 species
the probability of sending message mj 2Mj conditional on observing state j and we denote it by
j (mj j j), where the message space isMj = [ s; s] : Under Centralization, the decision rules map
messages m = (m1;m2) into decisions q1 2 R+ and q2 2 R+; and we denote them by qC1 (m) and
qC2 (m). Under Decentralization, the decision rule for Manager 1 maps the state 1 and messages
m = (m1;m2) into decision q1 2 R+ while the decision rule for Manager 2 maps the state 2 and
messages m = (m1;m2) into decision q1 2 R+; and we denote them by qD1 (m; 1) and qD2 (m; 2).
Under Divisional Centralization, the decision rules map the state 1 and message m = m2 into
decisions q1 2 R+ and q2 2 R+; and we denote them by qDC1 (m; 1) and qDC2 (m; 1). Finally, the
belief functions are denoted by gj (j j mj) for j = 1; 2 and characterize the receivers posterior
probability of state j conditional on receiving message mj .
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the communication subgame which require that
communication rules are optimal for the division managers given decision rules. Formally, when-
ever j(mj j j) > 0 then mj 2 argmaxm2Mj E
h
lj + (1  )lk j j
i
for l 2 fC;D;DCg,
where lj and 
l
k are, respectively, the prots of Divisions j and k, j 6= k; given that deci-
sions are made according to ql1 () and ql2 (). Perfect Bayesian Equilibria also require that the
decision rules are optimal for the decision makers given the belief functions. Thus, under Cen-
tralization qC1 () and qC2 () solve max(q1;q2) E [1 + 2 j m] ; under Decentralization qDj () solves
maxqj E [j + (1  )k j m; j ], and under Divisional Centralization qDC1 () and qDC2 () solve
max(q1;q2) E [1 + (1  )2 j m; 1] . Finally, Perfect Bayesian Equilibria require that the belief
functions are derived from the communication rules using Bayesrule whenever possible, that is,
gj (j j m) = j(mj j j)=
R
P j(mj j j)dj , where P =

j : j(mj j j) > 0
	
; j = 1; 2.
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PROPOSITION B1. For  2 (1=2; 1] and t 6= 0 there exists an integer N(; t), such that for all
N  N(; t) there exists at least one equilibrium (1() 2() ; q1(); q2(); g1(); g2()), where
a. j(mj j j) is uniform, supported on [aj;i 1; aj;i] if j 2 (aj;i 1; aj;i);
b. gj(j j mj) is uniform supported on [aj;i 1; aj;i] if mj 2 (aj;i 1; aj;i);
c. aj;i+1   aj;i = aj;i   aj;i 1 + 4bs (aj;i) for i = 1; :::; Nj   1
with bs = bC under Centralization as given by (17),
bs = bD under Decentralization as given by (18),
bs = bDC under Divisional Centralization as given by (19).
d. qj(m) = qCj ; j = 1; 2; under Centralization, where q
C
j are given by (31) and (32), and
qj(m; 1) = q
DC
j ; j = 1; 2;under Divisional Centralization, with q
D
j as in (33) and (34), and
qj(m; j) = q
D
j ; j = 1; 2; under Decentralization, where q
D
j are given by (35) and (36).
Proof: We rst show that communication equilibria are interval equilibria. For the case of Cen-
tralization let 2() be any communication rule for Manager 2. The expected utility of Manager 1
if the headquarter manager holds a posterior expectation 1 over 1 is given by
E2 [U1 j 1; 1] = E2

1
 bqC1 ; bqC2 ; 1+ (1  )2  bqC1 ; bqC2  ; (30)
with
q^C1 
b
2 (1  t2)(  c+ 1   tE [  c+ 2 j2() ]); and (31)
q^C2 
b
2 (1  t2)(E [  c+ 2 j2() ]  t (  c+ 1)): (32)
It can be shown that @
2
@1@1
E2 [U1 j 1; 1] > 0 and @
2
@21
E2 [U1 j 1; 1] < 0: This implies that for
any two di¤erent posterior expectations of the headquarter manager, say 1 < 1, there is at most
one type of Manager 1 that is indi¤erent between both. Now suppose that contrary to the assertion
of interval equilibria there are two states 11 < 
2
1 such that E2

U1 j 11; 1
  E2 U1 j 11; 1 and
E2

U1 j 21; 1

> E2

U1 j 21; 1

. But then E2

U1 j 21; 1
 E2 U1 j 21; 1 < E2 U1 j 11; 1 
E2

U1 j 11; 1

which violates @
2
@1@1
E2 [U1 j 1; 1] > 0 . The same argument can be applied to
Manager 2 for any reporting strategy 1() of Manager 1. Therefore all equilibria of the communi-
cation game under Centralization must be interval equilibria.
Now consider the case of Divisional Centralization. The expected utility of Manager 2 if Manager
1 holds a posterior expectation 2 over 2 is given by
E1 [U2 j 2; 2] = E1

(1  )1
 bqDC1 ; bqDC2 + 2  bqDC1 ; bqDC2 ; 2 ;
34
with
q^DC1 
b
2(1  21 )
(  c+ 1    (  c+ 2)) ; and (33)
q^DC2 
b
2(1  21 )

(  c+ 2)  
1   (  c+ 1)

: (34)
Again, it can be shown that @
2
@1@1
E2 [U2 j 2; 2] > 0 and @
2
@21
E1 [U2 j 2; 2] < 0: By the
same argument used previously for Centralization, we can then conclude that all equilibria in this
case are, again, interval equilibria.
For the case of Decentralization let 1() and 2() be communication rules of Manager 1 and
Manager 2, respectively. Sequential rationality implies that, in equilibrium, decision rules must
conform to
q^D1 =
b
2
(  c+ 1)   (E [q2 j1;m2 ]) ; and (35)
q^D2 =
b
2
(  c+ 2)   (E [q1 j1;m2 ]) ; (36)
where 1 denotes Manager 2s posterior expectation over 1: It can readily be seen that
@2
@1@1
E2 [U1 j 1; 1] > 0
and the proof follows as in the preceding paragraph.
We now characterize all equilibria of the communication game. For Manager j = 1; 2, let aj be
a partition of [ s; s], any message mj 2 (aj;i 1; aj;i) be denoted by mj;i, and mj;i be the receivers
posterior belief of the expected value of j after receiving message mj;i:
a. Centralization: The expected utility of Manager 1 in state a1;i is given by
E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i] =
b
4 (1  t2) [(  c)
2 (1  )   (m1;i)2 +
m1;i (  c) (2 (  c+ a1;i) + (2  1) t)  2t (  c) (  c+ a1;i)]:
In state a1;i Manager 1 must be indi¤erent between sending a message that induces a posterior
m1;i and a posterior m1;i+1 implying that E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i]   E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i+1] = 0. Given
decision rules (31) and (32) , and letting m1;i = (a1;i 1 + a1;i) =2 we have that E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i] 
E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i+1] = 0 if and only if a1;i = (a1;i 1 + a1;i+1) =
 
2 + 4bC

where bC is given by (17).
That is, communication equilibria under Centralization are equivalent to the constant-bias leading
example in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
From (17), we have that sign(bC) = sign(t  ) = sign(t):
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b. Divisional Centralization: Let k = =(1 ). The expected utility of Manager 2 in state a2;i
is given by
E1 [U2 j a2;i;m2;i] =
b(1  )
4 (1  k2)2 [
 
2k (k   1) 2 + 1  k32E1 h(  c+ 1)2i
:::+ (m2;i)
2  2k2   k   2+ 2km2;i (  c+ 2)  1  k2+
:::+ 2k (k   1)   1  2 (  c)m2;i   2k2 (  c) (  c+ 2)  1  k2 :
In state a2;i Manager 1 must be indi¤erent between sending a message that induces a posterior
m2;i and a posterior m2;i+1 implying that E1 [U2 j a2;i;m2;i]   E1 [U2 j a2;i;m2;i+1] = 0. Given
decision rules (33) and (34) , and lettingm2;i = (a2;i 1 + a2;i) =2 we have that E1 [U2 j a2;i;m2;i] 1
[U2 j a2;i;m2;i+1] = 0 if and only if a1;i = (a1;i 1 + a1;i+1) =
 
2 + 4bDC

where bDC is given by (19).
We now show that sign(bDC) = sign(t). Rewrite bDC as bDC(2) = bDC1 2 + b
DC
2 , where
bDC1 =
(2  1)2 t2
(1  )   43 + 3t2  t2 ;
bDC2 =
(2  1)   2t+ 4t  42 + t2
2 (1  )   43 + 3t2  t2 t(  c):
For all  2 [1=2; 1] and t 2 [ 1; 1] ; we have that   43 + 3t2  t2 < 0 and   2t+ 4t  42 + t2 <
0. This implies that bDC1 < 0, and sign(b
DC
2 ) = sign(t). That is, the communication bias increases
(in absolute value) with the state if and only if t < 0. Therefore, to show that sign(bDC) = sign(t)
we need only show that
bDC1 s+ b
DC
2 > 0 if t > 0; (37)
 bDC1 s+ bDC2 < 0 if t < 0: (38)
The inequality (37) is equivalent to
(  c)
s
>
2t (2  1) 
2t  4t+ 42   t2 > 0:
The maximum of the intermediate term above for given t > 0 satises
max
>1=2
2t (2  1) 
2t  4t+ 42   t2 = t(1  t) +p1  t2 < 1 + t1  t < (  c)s ;
where the last inequality follows from parameter restrictions that ensures positive quantities. This
proves that (37) is satised. Finally, the inequality (38) is equivalent to
(  c)
s
>
 2t (2  1) 
2t  4t+ 42   t2 > 0:
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By a similar reasoning as before we have that for given t < 0 satises
max
>1=2
 2t (2  1) 
2t  4t+ 42   t2 =  t(1  t) +p1  t2 < 1:
For t < 0 positive quantities is ensured as long as   c > s: This proves that (38) is satised.
c. Decentralization: If Manager 1 observes state 1 and sends message m1;i that induces a
posterior belief m1;i in Manager 2 his expected utility is given by
E2 [U1 j 1;m1;i] =  E2

1
 bqD1 ; bqD2 ; 1+ (1  )1  bqD1 ; bqD2  j 1;m1;i ; (39)
where qD1 and q
D
2 are given by (35) and (36). In state 1 = a1;i this can be written as E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i]
being equal to
b
4 (1  t2)((1  )
 
1  22 E2 h(  c+ 2)2i+ 2    2 + 2E2 m22j2()
:::+
 
+ 2   1 2 (m1;i)2 +   1  22 (  c+ a1;i)2
:::+ 22
 
1  2m1;i (  c+ a1;i)  2 (2  1) 3m1;iE2 [m2j2()]
:::  2  1  2E2 [(  c+ 2)] (  c+ a1;i)):
In state a1;i Manager 1 must be indi¤erent between sending a message that induces a posterior
m1;i and a posterior m1;i+1 implying that E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i]   E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i+1] = 0. If (1  
)= < 2 the above condition has no solution: essentially Manager 1 would like to induce the
highest possible belief in Manager 2. If, however, (1  )= > 2 then, given sequentially rational
decision making (35) and (36) and lettingm1;i = (a1;i 1 + a1;i) =2, we have that E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i] 
E2 [U1 j a1;i;m1;i+1] = 0 if and only if a1;i = (a1;i 1 + a1;i+1) =
 
2 + 4bD (a1;i)

, where bD (1) is
given by (18).
We now show that bD (1) is always positive and increasing. The condition (1   )= > 2
implies that the numerator of (18) is positive and thus bD (1) is increasing. Moreover, if t <
0; (1   ) (  c) > (  c) > s where the last inequality follows from considering parameter
values that induce positive quantities. Therefore bD ( s) > 0. If t > 0 then the parameter
restriction (  c) =s > (1 + t) = (1  t) that guarantees positive quantities, and the fact that for
t > 0 (1 + t) = (1  t) > 1= (1  t)  1= (1  ) ; together imply that bD ( s) > 0. This establishes
that bD (1) > 0 for all 1 2 [ s; s] :
In summary, given the independence of Manager 1 and 2s private information, the multi-
sender communication equilibrium decouples into two communication equilibria each of which is
equivalent to a sender-receiver game in which the state-dependent bias of the sender satises (18).
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In particular, since the communication bias bD (1) is strictly positive, communication necessarily
involves a nite number of intervals as shown in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
Proof of Lemma 1: Proposition B1 derives the expressions and properties for the communication
bias under both Centralization, Divisional Centralization and Decentralization. 
10.2 Appendix B2 - Residual Variance of Communication
In this appendix we rst derive closed form expressions for the residual variance under Centraliza-
tion, Divisional Centralization, and Decentralization. We then prove that these residual variances
possess some smoothness properties that enables us to characterize their behavior for  close to
1/2. We conclude by comparing the informativeness of vertical and horizontal communication.
10.2.1 Vertical Communication
Under Centralization the communication bias is constant, as in the leading example in Crawford and
Sobel (1982). Thus, for a given equilibrium with n intervals the residual variance of communication
V Cn satises
V Cn =
s2
3
(
1
n2
) +
1
3
 
bC
2  
n2   1 : (40)
The maximum number of intervals N(bC) satises 2N(bC)(N(bC)   1)jbC j  2s and is thus given
by
N(bC) = int
 
1
2
 
1 +
s
1 +
4s
jbC j
!!
;
where int(z) is the largest integer that does not exceed z. Therefore if
bC < s2 the residual variance
the communication under Centralization is
V C = V CN(bC) =
s2
3
(
1
N(bC)2
) +
1
3
 
bC
2  
N(bC)2   1 ;
and V C = s
2
3 if
bC > s2 .
10.2.2 Horizontal Communication
Under both Divisional Centralization and Decentralization the communication bias takes the form
bs (i) = b
s
1i + b
s
2;
for s 2 fDC;Dg with
bD1 = (2  1) =
 
1    2 ; bD2 = (1  ) (  c) ;
bDC1 = (2  1)2 t2= (1  )
 
3t2  43   t2 ; bDC2 = 1  1 2t   (  c):
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From Proposition B1, bD1 ; b
D
2 > 0 while b
DC
1 < 0 and sign(b
DC
2 ) = sign(t): We now derive the
residual variance for arbitrary b1; b2 > 0, to obtain (46) below. We will then consider the rate of
change of both residual variances as the conict vanishes.
Consider communication by Manager 1 and let a1 = fa1;igi=ni=0 be a partition of [ s; s] into n
intervals. If a1 characterizes a communication equilibrium by Manager 1 to Manager 2 then it must
satisfy the arbitrage condition
a1;i+1   a1;i = a1;i   a1;i 1 + 4(b1a1;i + b2); (41)
with boundary conditions a1;0 =  s and a1;n = s. Solving this second order linear di¤erence
equation we obtain
a1;i = Ax
i +B
1
xi
  b2
b1
; (42)
where x = 1+2b1+2
p
b1 (b1 + 1) > 1 is the solution of the characteristic equation associated with
(41) that exceeds 1 . Dening r and D as r = xn and D =  b2=sb1, the coe¢ cients A and B are
A =

  1
1  r  
D
1 + r

s; and
B =

1
1  r  
D
1 + r

sr;
and the size of each interval is given by
a1;i   a1;i 1 = (x  1)
xi
 
Ax2i 1  B : (43)
Maximum Number of Intervals. Let N (b1; b2) be the maximum number of intervals in
a communication equilibrium. The solution to the second order di¤erence equation characterizes
a communication equilibrium as long as the solution (42) is monotonic, i.e. a1;i   a1;i 1 > 0 is
positive. Since b1 > 0 and b2 > 0, we have A > 0: Therefore it su¢ ces that Ax > B to guarantee
that Ax2i 1 > B for all i; 1  i  N (b1; b2). From the denition of A and B we thus require
 r (D   1) (x+ 1) + r2 (D + 1) + x (D + 1) > 0:
The solution to this quadratic inequality is
r = xn  (D   1)
2 (D + 1)
(x+ 1) +
1
2
s
(D   1)2
(D + 1)2
(x+ 1)2   4x: (44)
It follows that N (b1; b2) is given by
N (b1; b2) = int
 
ln
 
(D   1)
2 (D + 1)
(x+ 1) +
1
2
s
(D   1)2
(D + 1)2
(x+ 1)2   4x
!
= lnx
!
:
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Residual Variance We next compute the residual variance of communication for a com-
munication equilibrium with n intervals, n  2. The variance of the message m1 to Manager 2
is
ED

m21

=
nX
i=1
Z a1;i
a1;i 1

a1;i + a1;i 1
2
2 1
2s
d1 =
1
8s
nX
i=1
(a1;i   a1;i 1) (a1;i + a1;i 1)2
=
1
8s
nX
i=1
 
a31;i   a31;i 1

+ a1;ia1;i 1 (a1;i   a1;i 1)

=
s2
4
+
1
8s
nX
i=1
a1;ia1;i 1 (a1;i   a1;i 1) :
And the residual variance on an n partition equilibrium is
V Dn = ED
h
(m1   1)2
i
=
s2
12
  1
8s
nX
i=1
a1;ia1;i 1 (a1;i   a1;i 1) :
We next compute a1;ia1;i 1 (a1;i   a1;i 1) : From (42) and the size of each interval (43) we have
a1;ia1;i 1 (a1;i   a1;i 1) = (x  1) [A
3
x2
x3i   xB
3
x3i
+
A2 (x+ 1)Ds
x2
x2i   B
2 (x+ 1)Ds
x2i
+A
(Ds)2 x+AB +ABx2  ABx
x2
xi  B (Ds)
2 x+AB +ABx2  ABx
xix
]:
From the sum of a geometric series
nX
i=1
xki = xk 1 r
k
1 xk we can simplify the summation of the previous
terms to obtain
NX
i=1
aiai 1 (ai   ai 1) =
 
r3   1A3   B3
r3

x
x2 + x+ 1

+
 
r2   1A2   B2
r2

(Ds)
+ (r   1)

A  B
r

(Ds)2 +AB

x2   x+ 1
x

: (45)
To further simplify this expression we rst note that
x
x2 + x+ 1
=
1
3 + 4b1
and
x2   x+ 1
x
= 1 + 4b1;
which follows from x being a solution to the characteristic equation of (41). Moreover, from the
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denitions of A;B and D we have
(r   1)

A 

B
r

= 2s;
 
r2   1 A2   B
r
2!
=  4Ds2; and
 
r3   1 A3   B
r
3!
= 2s
 
r2 + r + 1

(r2   1)2
  
r2 + 1
  
3D2 + 1
  2r  3D2   1 s2;
which, substituted into (45) yields
NX
i=1
aiai 1 (ai   ai 1) =
 
r2 + r + 1
   
r2 + 1
  
3D2 + 1
  2r  3D2   1
(r2   1)2

2
4b1 + 3

s3
 2D2s3   2r (1 + 4b1)
 
1
1  r
2
 

D
1 + r
2!
s3:
Substituting this expression into V sn and after some simplications we have
V sn =
s2
12
 
0@ 1  4D2b1
4 (4b1 + 3)
+ 4
b1 (b1 + 1)
(4b1 + 3)
r

D2   (1+r1 r )2

(r + 1)2
1A s2; (46)
where r = xn. Therefore the residual variance of communication is given by V s = V s
N(bs1;bs2)
,
s 2 fDC;Cg : 
10.2.3 Absolute Continuity of Residual Variances
The residual variance V s; s = fC;D;DCg ; is continuous in the own-division bias ; although non-
di¤erentiable whenever the number of intervals in the most informative communication equilibrium
changes value. As the number of intervals tends to innity as managers become more aligned
with each other, the residual variance has an innite number of points of discontinuity in every
neighborhood of  = 1=2. Nevertheless, the next lemma shows that V s retains certain smoothness
properties that allows us to characterize its behavior in a neighborhood of  = 1=2 through the
function @V s=@:
LEMMA B1. The residual variance of communication V s; s = fC;D;DCg is an absolutely contin-
uous function of  2 [1=2; 1] with a well-dened limit @V s=@ as  tends to 1=2. In particular,
lim
!1=2
@V C
@
=
4
3
s (  c) jtj;
lim
!1=2
@V DC
@
=
8
3
s (  c) jtj; and
lim
!1=2
@V D
@
=
2
9
s2

3
(  c) (1  t)
s
  1

4
1  t2 :
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Proof: The function V s; s = fC;D;DCg ; is continuous and increasing in  and its derivative is
dened except for a countable number of points. To establish absolute continuity of V s we need to
further show that (i.) its derivative is integrable, and (ii.) V s maps sets of measure zero into sets of
measure zero (Luzin N property; see Rudin 1986). Since the set of points of non-di¤erentiability of
V s is countable it follows readily that V s satises the Luzin N property (see Leoni 2009). We will
now show that @V s=@ is bounded in [1=2; 1], whenever dened, and this will establish integrability.
First, the case of Centralization. Di¤erentiating (40) we obtain
j@V
C
n
@bC
j = 2
3
jbC j  n2   1  2
3
s
N(bC) + 1
N(bC)
;
where the last inequality follows from the denition of N(bC). Therefore we obtain the uniform
bound
sup
;n
j@V
C
n
@
j  sup

2
3
s
N(bC) + 1
N(bC)
sup

@bC
@
=
2
3
s sup

@bC
@
:
We now show that @V C=@ approaches a well-dened limit as   ! 1=2: From the previous bound
we have
lim
jbC j!0
@V C
@bC
= lim
jbC j!0
2
3
s
N(bC) + 1
N(bC)
=
2
3
s:
Given that bC = (2  1) (  c)  we readily have that
lim
! 1
2
@V C
@ = 1
2
=
2
3
s lim
! 1
2
@
bC
@
=
4
3
s (  c) jtj: (47)
Now we turn to the case of Divisional Centralization and Decentralization. Totally di¤erentiating
(46) for n = N (b1; b2) we have
@V s
@
=

@V s
@r
@r
@x
@x
@b1
+
@V s
@b1

@b1
@
+
@V s
@D
@D
@
; s = fD;DCg
where r = xN(b1;b2). Computing each element in the previous expression we have
@V s
@r
@r
@x
@x
@b1
= N (b1; b2) r
0@4 D2   1

r2   2rD+1D 1 + 1

r2   2rD 1D+1 + 1

(4b1 + 3)
s2
1A pb1 (b1 + 1)
(r2   1)3
!
;
@V s
@b1
= s2
0@ 3D2 + 1
(4b1 + 3)
2  
4
 
6b1 + 4b
2
1 + 3

(4b1 + 3)
2
r

D2   (1+r1 r )2

(r + 1)2
1A ; and
@V s
@D
= 2s2Db1
 
(r   1)2   4rb1
(4b1 + 3) (r + 1)
2
!
: (48)
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To guarantee that @V s=@ is bounded we now show that it approaches a nite limit as  ! 1=2.
From the denition of r = xN(b1;b2) in (44) we have
lim
!1=2
(D 1)
2(D+1) (x+ 1) +
1
2
r
(D 1)2
(D+1)2
(x+ 1)2   4x
r
= 1;
which implies
lim
!1=2

r2   2rD   1
D + 1
+ 1

= 0
and
lim
!1=2
r

D2   (1+r1 r )2

(r + 1)2
=
r

D2  
4Dr
D+1
 4r
D+1

4Dr
D+1
=
1
4
(D + 1)2 :
With these limits applied to (48) we have
lim
! 1
2
@V s
@r
@r
@x
@x
@b1
= 0
lim
! 1
2
@V s
@b1
= s2

3D2 + 1
9
  1
3
(D + 1)2

=
2
9
s2 ( 3D   1)
lim
! 1
2
@V s
@D
= 0:
We now consider the cases of Decentralization and Divisional Centralization. For Decentralization,
we have that
lim
! 1
2
@b1
@
=
4
1  t2 ; and lim! 1
2
@D
@
=  2t(  c):
Therefore the limit of the total derivative as the own-division bias vanishes is
lim
!1=2
@V D
@
=
8
9
s2
1  t2

3(1  t)(  c)
s
  1

; (49)
which is bounded for jtj < 1. This establishes that @V D=@ is bounded and thus integrable.
We now turn to the case of Divisional Centralization. While in this case we have that
lim
! 1
2
@b1
@
= 0;
the derivative @D=@ becomes unbounded when ! 12 . As lim! 12
@V s
@D = 0, however, in this case
we obtain
lim
!1=2
@V DC
@D
@D
@
=
8
3
s (  c) jtj
and
lim
!1=2
@V DC
@
=
8
3
s (  c) jtj = 2 lim
!1=2
@V C
@
: 
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COROLLARY B1. If lim!1=2 @V
s
@ > lim!1=2
@V l
@ s; l 2 fC;DC;Dg then there exists an " > 0
such that V s() > V l() for all  2 (1=2; 1=2 + "): Conversely, if lim!1=2 @V s@ < lim!1=2 @V
l
@
then there exists an " > 0 such that V s() < V l() for all  2 (1=2; 1=2 + "):
Proof: As V l; l = fC;DC;Dg are absolutely continuous the fundamental theorem of calculus holds
(Rudin 1987) and we have thath
V s()  V l()
i
 
h
V s(1=2)  V l(1=2)
i
=
Z 
1=2
@
@

V s   V l

d:
As all structures achieve full revelation of information for  = 1=2, if
lim
!1=2
@

V s   V l

=@ > 0
it follows that there exists an " > 0 such that
V s() > V l();  2 (1=2; 1=2 + "):
The last claim of the corollary follows from an equivalent argument. 
10.2.4 Informativeness of Vertical and Horizontal Communication
Proof of Lemma 2: Proposition B1 derives the expressions for bC , bDC , and bD. Consider rst
Part (i.) of the Lemma. We will show that, for any i 2 [ s; s];  2 (1=2; 1] and t < 0 we havebC < bD. That is, the point-wise communication bias under Decentralization is always larger
than under Centralization when t < 0. Then, it follows from Chen and Gordon (2013) that a
smaller point-wise bias leads to more informative communication.
Given that, when t < 0; bC is constant and negative and bD is positive and increasing, it follows
that
 = min bD   jbC j = 2  1
1    2
  
1     3 (  c)  s :
Since
 
1     3 > 0 for  1  t  0; 1=2    1 then   0 if and only if
  c
s
 1
1     3 :
Since positive quantities requires (  c) =s > 1 when t < 0 and
sup
 1<t0
1=21
1
1     3 = 1;
then we readily have that  > 0.
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We now turn to Part (ii.) of the Lemma. Part (ii.a) follows from Lemma B1 which states that
lim
!1=2
@V DC
@
= 2 lim
!1=2
@V C
@
;
and corollary B1.
To prove Part (ii.b), rst note that, on average, the absolute value of the communication bias
is larger under Decentralization than under Centralization when t > 0. As shown in Proposition
B1, a necessary condition for informative horizontal communication is that 1 
2 < 1: Therefore,
whenever bD is well dened we have
1  
(1  ) (1  1 2)
>
1  
(1  ) (1  2) >
2
1 + 
> 1 > j j;
implying
E

bD

= (2  1) (  c) 1  
(1  ) (1  1 2)
> jbC j:
However, unlike the case where t < 0, we could have cases where the point-wise communication
bias under Decentralization is smaller than under Centralization. To see this, note that when t > 0;
we have
 = min bD (i)  jbC j = 2  1
1    2
   2 +  + 3 + 1 (  c)  s
Since
  2 +  + 3 + 1 > 0 for 0  t  1; 1=2    1 then   0 if, and only if,
(  c)=s  1=   2 +  + 3 + 1 :
We rst note that
max
1=21
1
( 2 +  + 3 + 1) =
2
(t+ 2) (1  t)2 :
Since the restriction to positive quantities requires (  c)=s > (1+ t)=(1  t), and (1+ t)=(1  t) >
2= (t+ 2) (1  t)2 for t < p2  1 it then follows that
  0 if 0  t 
p
2  1:
If, however, t >
p
2  1, then for  close to 1=2 we can have
(  c)=s < 1=   2 +  + 3 + 1 ;
implying that bD ( s) < jbC j. Since bD (j) is increasing in j the existence of a state j where
bD(j) < b
C for j < j follows. We next show that this reversal may translate into horizontal
communication being more informative than vertical communication for small own-division bias.
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Applying Corollary B1 we conclude that horizontal communication is more informative than vertical
in a neighborhood of  = 1=2 if, and only if,
1 + t
1  t <
  c
s
<
2
 9t+ 3t3 + 6 ;
where the rst inequality follows from the parameter restriction that ensures positive quantities in
equilibrium and the second from comparing the limits (47) and (49). For t < 0:876 49; we have
1+t
1 t >
2
 9t+3t3+6 implying that vertical communication is more informative than horizontal for 
close to 1=2. Dene
t = max

0:876 49;min

t :
  c
s
<
2
 9t+ 3t3 + 6

:
If t > t then we have that both 1+t1 t <
2
 9t+3t3+6and
 c
s <
2
 9t+3t3+6 , implying that there exists an
" > 0 such that for  2 (1=2; 1=2 + ") horizontal communication is more informative than vertical.

10.3 Appendix B3 - Relative Performance
We now turn to comparing the relative performance of Centralization, Divisional Centralization,
and Decentralization for a vanishing small own-division bias. We start with a technical lemma that
translates the smoothness properties of V s; s = fC;DC;Dg derived in Lemma B1 to the comparison
of prots under all organizational structures.
LEMMA B2. The di¤erence in performance s  D, s = fC;DCg ; is an absolutely continuous
function of : The limit @
 
s  D =@ , s = fC;DCg ; as  tends to 1=2 exists and, if its
positive, there exists an " > 0 such that s > D for  2 (1=2; 1=2 + "), while, if it is negative,
then there exists an " > 0 such that s < D for  2 (1=2; 1=2 + "):
Proof: Lemma B1 establishes that the residual variances of communication V C , V DC , and V D
are absolutely continuous and the limit of @V s=@ s = fC;DC;Dg exist as  ! 1=2. As C ;
DC and D are di¤erentiable functions of V s it follows that s  D, s = fC;DCg is absolutely
continuous for  2 [1=2; 1] with a well dened limit as ! 1=2. By application of the fundamental
theorem of calculus we have
s() D()  s(1=2) D(1=2) = Z 
1=2
@
 
s  D =@d:
Since both Centralization, Divisional Centralization and Decentralization achieve rst best per-
formance for  = 1=2, if lim!1=2 @
 
s  D =@ > 0 it follows that there exists an " > 0 such
that
s() > D();  2 (1=2; 1=2 + "):
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The case lim!1=2 @
 
s  D =@ < 0 follows similarly from an equivalent argument. 
The previous analysis showed that vertical communication is more informative than horizontal
communication under Decentralization whenever t < 0. We now show that this communication
advantage may be su¢ cient for the organization to move to a centralized structure even for a
vanishing small conict.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we show that
lim
!1=2
@

C  DC
@
= 0: (50)
That is, to a rst order, there are no di¤erences between Centralization and Divisional Centraliza-
tion for a vanishingly small conict of interest. In particular, this implies that
sign
 
lim
!1=2
@

DC  D
@
!
= sign
 
lim
!1=2
@

C  D
@
!
and, by Lemma B2, it follows that whenever Decentralization dominates Centralization, it also
dominates Divisional Centralization, and, conversely, whenever Decentralization is dominated by
Centralization, it is also dominated by Divisional Centralization.
To prove (50), we have that the di¤erence DC  C in the performance of Centralization and
Divisional Centralization is given by (21) and the limit of the rate of change of this di¤erence is
lim
!1=2
@

DC  D
@
=
b
2(1  t2)

1
2
lim
!1=2
@V DC
@
  lim
!1=2
@V C
@

:
Then (50) follows since Lemma B1 implies that lim!1=2 @V DC=@ = 2 lim!1=2 @V C=@.
We now turn to the comparison between Centralization and Decentralization. The di¤erence
C  D is given by (20) and the limit of the rate of change of this di¤erence is
lim
!1=2
@

C  D
@
=
b
2(1  t2)

t2 lim
!1=2
@V Di
@
  lim
!1=2
@V C
@

:
From Lemma B2, Centralization dominates Decentralization for  close to 1=2 if lim!1=2 @
 
C  D =@ >
0; which translates to
t2 lim
!1=2
@V Di
@
> lim
!1=2
@V Ci
@
:
Using the limits (47) and (49), the previous inequality translates into
8
9
s2t2
1  t2

3(1  t)(  c)
s
  1

>
4
3
s (  c) jtj;
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which can be written as
s
  c <
3(1  t) (2jtj   t  1))
2jtj :
For t > 0 this condition is never satised. If t < 0 we can solve for t to obtain that Centralization
dominates Decentralization when t < t with
t =
1
9

3  s
  c

 
r
(
s
  c)
2   6 s
  c + 36

: 
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Figure 4: The Informativeness of Communication for Small Own-Division Bias
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Figure 5: Optimal Organizational Structure for Small Own-Division Bias
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